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Int ro duct io n - T he Servile and t he Aut o no mo us
As  Japan mo ved to  co nduct Ho use o f Representatives  electio ns  in December 2012, attentio n in Wes tern media and academic circles
turned, as  it do es  fro m time to  time, to  the ques tio n o f whether the co untry was  in decline, o r even in so me so rt o f cris is . Already
five years  have passed s ince the Minis ter fo r Eco no mic Po licy declared to  the Natio nal Diet that “in eco no mic t erms Japan is no
lo nger a f irst -class co unt ry,” by which she meant  t hat  it s GDP had shrunk belo w 10  per cent  as a pro po rt io n o f
t he wo rld's fo r t he f irst  t ime in 24  years.1 It has  co ntinued to  fall s ince then. As  a pro po rtio n o f glo bal GDP, Japan was  15 per
cent in 1990, fell belo w 10  per cent in 2008, is  expected to  fall to  6  per cent in 2030  and 3.2 per cent in 2060, while China’s  rises
s teadily, fro m 2 per cent in 1990  to  a predicted 25 per cent in 2030  and 27.8  per cent in 2060.2 It is  that shift in relative weight,
perhaps  mo re than anything (natio nal debt, aging, shrinking po pulatio n) that dis turbs  Japan.
In meta-his to rical terms , Japan has  preserved a wary dis tance fro m China fo r well o ver a millennium, ever s ince the “Battle o f
Baekgang” (o r Hakusukino e) in the year 663, when the co mbined fo rces  o f Tang-Silla (s tates  then do minating China and the Ko rean
peninsula) defeated the co mbined fo rces  o f Baekje and Yamato  (rival s tates  o n the Ko rean peninsula and the Japanese is lands).3
 
Fo r 1,350  years  s ince then, Japan has  carefully nurtured its  dis tance and independence
fro m inco rpo ratio n in any Sinic wo rld o rder, alternating between fear o f being invaded, as
was  threatened but did no t o ccur in the late 7th century but then did o ccur but fail (under
the Mo ngo ls ) in the 12th century, and failed attempts  to  supplant the Sinic o rder with o ne
under its  o wn hegemo ny in the 16 th and 20th centuries  (led by Hideyo shi in the firs t and
the Imperial Japanese Army in the seco nd). There is  no  his to rical mo del fo r an inter-s tate
relatio nship o f equality and mutual respect, and nego tiatio n in that directio n beco mes
so  much the mo re diff icult, fo r bo th s ides , the mo re likely eventual Chinese superio rity
beco mes . Needless  to  say, this  meta-his to rical view, with its  serio us  implicatio ns  fo r
co ns tructio ns  o f Japanese identity, is  no t widely dis cussed in Japan, where China’s
current and co ntinuing rise tends  to  be seen s imply as  “threat.”
If the China relatio nship is  therefo re pro blematic, so  to o  is  the relatio nship with the
United States , tho ugh it to o  is  in ways  different fro m co mmo n perceptio n. As  Japan went
to  the po lls  in December 2012, all majo r parties  agreed o n the need to  co nfirm,
reinfo rce, o r deepen the relatio nship, while a mino rity, albeit an influential o ne, held it to
be fundamentally flawed and in need o f revis io n. Where Japan fo r 1,350  years  res is ted
beco ming a Chinese “client s tate,” many believe that in jus t o ver a half-century Japan has
embraced precisely that ro le to wards  the United States . In this  view, Japan’s  servility as  a
US “client s tate” res ts  at the heart o f As ia’s  pro blems .
The cleares t recent express io n o f this  view is  to  be fo und in a bo o k published in Augus t
2012, entitled The Truth of Postwar [Japanese] History. Autho r Mago saki Ukeru is  a fo rmer
head o f the Intelligence and Analys is  Bureau o f the Japanese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ,
who  had also  served as  ambassado r to  Uzbekis tan and Iran and pro fesso r at the
Natio nal Defense Univers ity.4 Mago saki sees  the s ixty-seven years  o f Japan’s  po s t-war his to ry in terms  o f the co ntes t between
factio ns  within the s tate favo uring “auto no my”「自主路線 (meaning an independent fo reign po licy, especially the reductio n o r
eliminatio n o f US military bases , and clo ser ties  to  As ian neighbo urs ) and “servility”「追従路線」, tho se who  s imply fo llo wed US
ins tructio ns . The latter, in his  view, had gradually beco me entrenched and the servile line was  fo llo wed by go vernment after
go vernment and by natio nal and o pinio n leaders .
No  less  than eight po s t-1945 Prime Minis ters , he believes , had belo nged to  the “auto no mo us” s cho o l and been eliminated o n
ins tructio ns  o r under pressure fro m Washingto n, while tho se in the Servility s cho o l had las ted lo nger, tended to  thrive, and left by
far the larger mark o n the po lity. His  bo o k plainly to uched a nerve because by early Octo ber it had so ared up the bes t-seller lis ts
into  the 200 ,000-plus  range.
 
Mago saki’s  bo o k co nfirms  and reinfo rces  what I had written in 2007, in Client State – Japan in the American Embrace.5 At that time, my
term “Client State,” o r in Japanese Zokkoku, was  a sho cking deviatio n fro m mains tream Wes tern and academic writing. It is  grim
satis factio n, five years  o n, to  find my thes is  co nfirmed in a bes t-seller by a senio r figure fro m the Japanese bureaucratic
es tablishment. Fo r my zokkoku o r client s tate Mago saki subs titutes  the essentially identical no tio n o f the tsuiju rosen o r servile line.
The divis io n o f wo rld s tates  into  po litical s cience catego ries  o f independent (so vereign, natio n) s tates  and subject (co lo nial o r
neo -co lo nial) s tates  tends  to  neglect the increas ingly impo rtant, in-between catego ry o f “client s tates .” The fo rmal so vereignty o f
the client s tate is  no t in ques tio n, but it co mbines  independence and demo cratic respo ns ibility with renunciatio n o f independence o r
deliberately cho sen submiss io n, such that it is  to  be described o nly by o xymo ro nic terms  such as  “dependent independence” o r
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“servile so vereignty.” I have sugges ted a definitio n that dis tinguishes  it fro m o ther,
related fo rms  o f co lo nial, co nquered, o r directly do minated, o r neo -co lo nial territo ry as
“a s tate that enjo ys  the fo rmal trappings  o f Wes tphalian so vereignty and
independence, and is  therefo re neither a co lo ny no r a puppet s tate, but which
has  internalised the requirement to  give preference to  ‘o ther’ interes ts  o ver its
o wn.” 6
The puzz ling but crucial fact is  that submiss io n is  no t fo rced but cho sen. The client s tate
is  happy to  have its  “patro n” o ccupy parts  o f its  territo ry, and determined at all co s ts  to
avo id giving it o ffence. It pays  meticulo us  attentio n to  ado pting and pursuing po licies
that will satis fy its  patro n, and readily pays  whatever price necessary to  be sure that the
patro n no t abando n it. Having so me o f the qualities  o f a feudal relatio nship in the sense
o f the exchange o f fealty fo r pro tectio n, it may therefo re also  be described as  “neo -
feudal.” As  o ne scho lar puts  it, “‘servitude’ is  no  lo nger jus t a necessary means  but is
happily embraced and bo rne. ‘Spo ntaneo us  freedo m’ beco mes  indis tinguishable fro m
‘spo ntaneo us  servitude’.”7
Tho ugh there is  no  agreed so cial s cience term to  describe it, in co mmo n parlance it is
what is  kno wn as  the “po o dle” syndro me - the term the UK widely ado pted to  apply to  the
go vernment o f To ny Blair (PM, 1997-2007) in the United Kingdo m. Aus tralia’s  Prime
Minis ter Jo hn Ho ward (PM, 1996-2007) was  in s imilar vein o ften referred to  as  a US
“deputy sheriff.” In Japan so me critics  referred to  Prime Minis ter Ko izumi (PM, 2001-
2006) as  a “pochi” (pet do g) and within the Geo rge W. Bush White Ho use he was  kno wn -
at leas t to  so me - as  “Sergeant-Majo r Ko izumi.” Fo r any analys is  o f the client s tate
pheno meno n these three cases  deserve clo se attentio n.
To  such a lis t so me might sugges t adding So uth Ko rea, Is rael, o r vario us  Latin American
o r Middle Eas tern co unties . Ho wever, as  fo r So uth Ko rea, s ince its  revo lutio n in 1987
and especially in the pres idencies  o f Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Ro h Mo o -Hyun
(2003-08), it sho wed a s ingular independent-mindedness  and readiness  to  co ntes t
Washingto n’s  po licy prescriptio ns , unimaginable o n the part o f Japan. The Is rael case is
peculiar because in a sense in that relatio nship the clientilism is  reversed, with Is rael
exercis ing as  leas t as  much influence o ver US po licies  as  the reverse. As  fo r Latin
America and the Middle Eas t it is  hard to  say mo re than that recent po litical changes  have
trans fo rmed and co ntinue to  trans fo rm bo th regio ns , leaving client s tates  in general a
diminishing species .
Tho ugh he do es  no t sys tematize o r rank them, Mago saki refers  to  certain dis tinguishing marks  o f the auto no mo us  line: o bjectio n
to  payment o f the co s ts  o f the US o ccupying fo rces , demand fo r the return o f US military bases  o r their dras tic reductio n, the
attempt to  tie Japan’s  fo reign po licy to  the United Natio ns  and to  disarmament causes , the reluctance to  be invo lved in war, fro m
Ko rea in 1950  to  Vietnam in the 1960s  and Afghanis tan and Iraq later, the attempt to  reduce “ho s t natio n suppo rt” subs idies  fo r US
fo rces  in Japan, the call fo r equidis tant diplo macy with China and engagement in co ns tructio n o f an As ian o r Eas t As ian co mmunity.
Adherents  o f the “servile” line, o n the o ther hand, have ins is ted o n the “alliance” as  the charter o f the s tate (with prio rity o ver the
co ns titutio n), o n the US presence in Okinawa, and o n either co ns titutio nal revis io n o r revis io n o f its  interpretatio n (so  as  to  allo w
“co llective security” and “no rmal” military po wer). One might no w add attitude to ward the Trans  Pacific Partnership (TPP) s cheme as
a co ntempo rary defining is sue. Omino us ly, by 2012 the differences  o ver China po licy, co llective security, and co ns titutio nal revis io n
had narro wed. Eight o f the parties  co ntes ting the December 2012 electio n gave pro minence to  the “Japan-US alliance,” seeking o nly
that it be maintained, reinfo rced, o r deepened, while o nly the Co mmunis t Party and the (no w minuscule) So cial Demo cratic Party,
neither o f which had any pro spect o f po wer, wo uld dis so lve o r renego tiate it.8
Mago saki’s  fo rmulatio n o f Japan’s  po s t-1945 his to ry in terms  o f a binary co ntes t is  pro vo cative but perhaps  in need o f so me
clarif icatio n. Firs t, altho ugh he do es  no t address  the po int specifically, his  analys is  appears  to  assume that Japan’s  is  a unique
s tate fo rmatio n, ro o ted in the experience o f defeat in war, o ccupatio n, and impo s itio n o f bas ic ins titutio nal frame by its  co nquero r
between s ix and seven decades  ago . Yet the parallels  o n the part o f o ther US allied s tates , no tably the “Anglo -Saxo n” s tates  o f
United Kingdo m and Aus tralia, neither o f which has , at leas t in mo dern times , been a US enemy, sugges t that defeat and o ccupatio n
is  no t a necessary pre-co nditio n. Dependent independence deserves  attentio n as  a pheno meno n in its  o wn right.
Seco nd, the applicatio n o f the servile-auto no mo us  fo rmula to  the po s t-war perio d as  a who le tends  to  o bscure its  defining criteria
and s ignificant trans itio ns . “Servility” surely had different implicatio ns  and was  expressed differently in 1960, 1990, and 2010.
Witho ut clear definitio n, there is  an element o f capricio usness  in the way the labels  are applied. Mago saki makes  an especially
s tro ng case fo r seeing fo ur early po s t-war leaders  — Shigemitsu Mamo ru (Fo reign Minis ter in 1945), Ashida Hito shi (Prime Minis ter
in 1948), Hato yama Ichiro  (Prime Minis ter in 1954-5), and Ishibashi Tanzan (Prime Minis ter in 1955-1957) — to gether with so me
o f their later successo rs , no tably Tanaka Kakuei (Prime Minis ter in 1972-74), and Hato yama Yukio  (Prime Minis ter in 2009-10), as
auto no mis ts . Ho wever, his  inclus io n o n the same lis t o f Kishi No busuke (Prime Minis ter in 1957-60) and Sato  Eisaku (Prime
Minis ter in 1960-64) is  such as  to  raise do ubt as  to  the usefulness  o f any such inclus ive criteria.9  With that reservatio n, ho wever,
Mago saki is  plainly right to  ins is t that servile line go vernments  — under which catego ry he includes  tho se o f Yo shida (1948-54),
Ikeda (1960-64), Nakaso ne (1982-87), and Ko izumi (2001-2006) — have tended to  las t lo nger and have a greater impact than
auto no mo us  line o nes .
Third, Mago saki belittles  mass  po pular pro tes t mo vements  (especially tho se o f 1960  agains t revis io n o f the Security Treaty) and
fo cusses  ins tead o n the bureaucracy. He draws  attentio n, fo r example, to  a “To p Secret” 1969  Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs  do cument
as  evincing the s trength o f the auto no my line. Entitled “Outline o f Japan’s  Diplo matic Po licy” (Wagakuni no gaiko seisaku taiko), it
spelled o ut the need to  “gradually reduce and reo rganize US bases  in Japan (while retaining “a small number”) to  co o perate with
“co untries  such as  Sweden” o n internatio nal disarmament is sues , and “to  avo id at all co s ts  giving the impress io n o f being America’s
running do g.”10  Ho wever, in the co ntext o f the paper as  a who le, these are little mo re than auto no mo us  flo urishes  in a bureaucratic
essay that was  secret, reso lutely pro -alliance and pro -“security” as  it might have been unders to o d by alliance managers . This
do cument was  drawn up even as  the Minis try (and go vernment) was  nego tiating Okinawan “revers io n” in such a way as  to  give fulles t
co ns ideratio n to  ass is ting the US war in Vietnam and prio ritiz ing future war preparatio ns  o ver the co ns titutio n o r the interes ts  and
des ires  o f the Okinawan peo ple. It is  a thin bas is  o n which to  co ns truct a s ignificant auto no mo us  s train in minis terial thinking.
Furthermo re, a decade later, Ono  Katsumi, identif ied by Mago saki as  the co re figure in this  s cho o l at that time (Vice Minis ter in
1957-8) wro te ruefully,
President  Geo rge W. Bush and Prime Minist er
Ko iz umi Junichiro , July 20 0 6
“In Japan’s  fo reign po licy, based s ince the end o f the war o n fo llo wing the wishes  o f the o ccupying fo rces , i.e., the
Americans , the idea to o k ro o t that it wo uld be eno ugh to  co ncentrate o n the eco no my, which presented eno ugh
difficulties , and to  leave everything else to  the Americans , so  that the spirit o f auto no my and independence was
lo s t.”11
Bureaucratic res is tance to  servility, as  in this  “Outline,” was  inevitably susceptible to  co mpro mise because it was  elitis t and largely
detached fro m po pular, grass ro o ts , demo cratic mo vement. Bureaucratic gro ups  such as  the autho rs  o f the “Outline” equivo cated in
the attempt to  push back at the margins  agains t servility, preferring mo des t adjus tments  to  fro ntal challenge and rarely if ever
co nfro nted the kernel o f the relatio nship. No t until the rise o f the Demo cratic Party 40  years  later did that change, when the “zokkoku
ques tio n” merged with the “Okinawa ques tio n” (o n which belo w).
 
Po st -Co ld War
In the po s t-Co ld War perio d, the Ho so kawa Mo rihiro  go vernment
made a brief attempt in 1993-4 to  articulate an auto no mo us  line. A
repo rt prepared at its  reques t by Higuchi Ko taro  o f Asahi Beer no ted
the s lo w decline o f US hegemo nic po wer and reco mmended Japan
ado pt a mo re auto no mo us , multilateral, and UN-centred diplo macy.
But it was  quickly o verwhelmed and abando ned fo llo wing the return
o f LDP-led go vernment and the US ripo s te in the fo rm o f the Jo seph
Nye repo rt o f 1995 that ins is ted that Eas t As ian security depended
o n the “o xygen” o f US military presence and the base sys tem had to
be preserved and reinfo rced.12
While Japan itself experienced a series  o f weak and sho rt-term
go vernments , Japanese po licy in Washingto n was  the subject o f no n-
partisan co nsensus  and remarkable co ns is tency. The principles  o f
the relatio nship were defined in a series  o f general s tatements
is sued fro m Washingto n in 1995, 2000, 2007 and 2012 by the gro up
o f Eas t As ian specialis ts  centring o n Jo seph Nye and Richard
Armitage. Under their o vers ight, the legal and ins titutio nal refo rms
to  trans fo rm the Alliance were ado pted, and fro m their general
principles  highly specific demands  fo llo wed — “sho w the flag,” in the
burgeo ning Middle Eas tern co nflict, “put bo o ts  o n the gro und” in
Iraq, send the MSDF to  the Indian Ocean, buy US miss ile-defense sys tems  and o ther military hardware, and co ns truct new US base
facilities  in Okinawa.
The mo s t recent o f these Washingto n ho milies  in 2012 cautio ned Japan to  think carefully as  to  whether o r no t it
wanted to  remain a “tier-o ne” natio n.13 To  ho ld such po s itio n wo uld entail taking s teps  to  “s tand sho ulder-to -
sho ulder” with the US, sending naval gro ups  to  the Pers ian Gulf and the So uth China Sea, relaxing its  res trictio ns  o n
arms  expo rts , increas ing its  defense budget and military perso nnel numbers , resuming its  co mmitment to  civil
nuclear po wer, press ing ahead with co ns tructio n o f new base facilities  in Okinawa, Guam, and the Mariana Is lands ,
and revis ing either its  co ns titutio n o r the way it is  interpreted so  as  to  facilitate “co llective security,” i.e. merging its
fo rces  with tho se o f the US witho ut inhibitio n in regio nal and glo bal battlefields . Under the o verarching principle o f
the “Air Sea Battle” do ctrine, there wo uld be much mo re “intero perability” – sharing training and base facilities  – o f
Japanese and US fo rces  (in Okinawa, Guam, the Marianas , and Darwin). Pro minent Washingto n figures  urge Japan to
buy new weapo n and miss ile sys tems , including F-35 s tealth fighters  and Aegis  des tro yers .14 Any tho ught o f
po ss ibly reducing the huge financial subs idy it paid the Pentago n (aro und $8  billio n per year) by way o f “ho s t natio n
suppo rt” (the omoiyari o r “sympathy” budget), such as  briefly entertained in the early days  o f the Demo cratic Party
go vernment in 2009, sho uld be set as ide.15 If Japan balked at any o f this , Washingto n intimated, it wo uld s imply
s lide into  “two -tier” s tatus , and that, clearly, wo uld be beneath co ntempt.
While the US patro n thus  pressed its  client Japan to  make the relatio nship into  a “mature” alliance, it also  is sued parallel eco no mic
no s trums  under the rubric o f “Annual Statement o f Refo rm Des iderata” (nenji kaikaku yobosho) that set o ut general neo -liberal
principles  and particular applicatio ns , such as  the “do mes tic market expanding (naiju kakudai) measures  under which Japan
disas tro us ly inves ted pro digio us  sums  o n public wo rks  in the 1990s , po s tal privatisatio n (ado pted in a highly success ful electo ral
campaign by Ko izumi in 2005), and the o ngo ing demands  fo r “o pening” o f the Japanese markets  in finance, insurance, health
services  and pharmaceuticals . Ko izumi Junichiro ’s  prime minis tership (2001-2006), co inciding fo r much o f the pres idency o f Geo rge
W. Bush (2001-2009) came to  be seen as  the “go lden years ” o f the alliance. As  Mo riya Takemasa (Vice-Minis ter fo r Defense in
2002-2006) later remarked, “It is  called an alliance, but in practice the US s ide jus t decides  things  unilaterally.” 16  “Sergeant-Majo r
Ko izumi” (as  Bush repo rtedly referred to  him) was  much appreciated fo r the effo rt he put into  implementing the US agenda, and was
rewarded as  his  term o f o ffice appro ached its  end in 2006  with a special, pres identially-guided vis it to  Graceland.
Oz awa, Hat o yama and t he Okinawa Fact o r
The DPJ’s  2005 Manifes to  declared a co mmitment to  “…do  away with the dependent relatio nship in which Japan ultimately has  no
alternative but to  act in acco rdance with US wishes , replacing it with a mature alliance based o n independence and equality.” As  the
credibility o f the LDP faded and the s tar o f the o ppo s itio n Demo cratic Party o f Japan ro se in 2008-9 , it was  Jo seph Nye (autho r in
1995 o f the crucial po s t-Co ld War po licy do cument) who  emerged at the heart o f the Washingto n mo bilizatio n o f pressure to
neutralize the DPJ befo re and then after it to o k po wer. In December 2008, he spelled o ut the three acts  that Co ngress  wo uld be
inclined to  see as  “anti-American”: cancellatio n o f the Maritime Self-Defense Agency’s  Indian Ocean miss io n, and any attempt to
revise the Status  o f Fo rces  Agreement o r the agreements  o n relo cating US Fo rces  in Japan [i.e. including the Futenma trans fer],17
repeating the same bas ic message to  the Demo cratic Party’s  Maehara Seiji in the early days  o f the Obama adminis tratio n. When
Maehara so ught to  co nvey his  party’s  wishes  to  renego tiate these agreements , Nye warned that to  do  so  wo uld be seen as  “anti-
American.”18  The Nye frame o f thinking, unchanged fro m his  earlier repo rt o f 1995 and des tined to  be res tated perio dically
thereafter, was  predicated o n two  general principles : dis trus t o f Japan and need fo r US military o ccupatio n to  co ntinue indefinitely.
On 24 February 2009, Ozawa Ichiro , then the DPJ’s  head (representative), sugges ted that the US 7th Fleet, ho me po rted at
Yo ko suka, sho uld be adequate to  any security purpo se in the regio n, and that o ther US bases , including no tably tho se in Okinawa,
were no  lo nger necessary. To  pro po se equaliz ing the US relatio nship and liquidating the bases  was  to  reject servility and challenge
Washingto n fundamentally. It was  the cleares t imaginable s tatement o f a Japanese fo reign and defense po licy that wo uld subs titute
a UN- and Eas t As ia-centre fo r the lo ng-es tablished US centre. It was  therefo re into lerable. Jus t a week after his  remarks , Ozawa
was  arres ted o n co rruptio n charges  and it was  no t till three and a half years  later that he was  fully cleared. The po int o f these lo ng-
drawn o ut pro ceedings  was  no t so  much inno cence o r guilt as  remo val o f the DPJ’s  mo s t effective and co urageo us  leader and
ro o ting o ut o f the “auto no mo us” factio n in Japanese po litics .19
Hato yama Yukio , who  to o k the reins  fro m Ozawa and led the Demo crats  to  electo ral victo ry at the end o f Augus t, shared (with him)
a s imilar vis io n fo r Japan and tapped a natio nal mo o d o f des ire fo r change. He pro mised to  take back go vernment fro m the
bureaucrats  and o pen it to  the peo ple thro ugh their elected representatives ; to  renego tiate the relatio nship with the US o n the
bas is  o f equality; to  reject “market fundamentalism” and to  re-o rient Japan away fro m US-centred unipo larism to wards  a multipo lar
wo rld in which Japan wo uld be a central member o f an Eas t As ian co mmunity, to  pro mo te lo cal self-go vernment, and (as  a kind o f
co ncentrated express io n in co ncrete fo rm o f all o f the abo ve) to  clo se (by mo ving so mewhere o uts ide Okinawa) the Futenma
marine base. Hato yama described his  co re philo so phical co ncept o f Yuai as  so mething that was  “...a s tro ng, co mbative co ncept that
is  a banner o f revo lutio n,”20  us ing the wo rd “revo lutio n” in a way no  Japanese Prime Minis ter had ever used it befo re. He o pened the
Diet sess io n in January 2010  with the wo rds .
“I want to  pro tect peo ple’s  lives .
That is  my wish: to  pro tect peo ple’s  lives
I want to  pro tect the lives  o f tho se who  are bo rn; o f tho se who  gro w up and mature…”
Such pro no uncements  dis turbed Washingto n. To  speak o f “pro tecting life” seemed bizarre dreaming to  tho se fo r who m readiness  to
take it was  rather the mark o f serio usness . Richard Armitage o bserved scathingly that the Demo cratic Party was  “speaking a
different language” and that he and his  co lleagues  were “sho cked by its  platfo rm,” and Jo seph Nye referred to  it as  “inexperienced,
divided and s till in the thrall o f campaign pro mises ,” by which he meant that attempts  to  renego tiate the agreement o n the Futenma
replacement base plan wo uld no t be to lerated. 21 Defense Secretary Ro bert Gates , demanding Hato yama’s  submiss io n, added insult
to  ultimatum by refus ing to  attend a welco ming ceremo ny at the Defense Minis try o r to  dine with senio r Japanese Defense o fficials .
The Washington Post described Hato yama as  “the bigges t lo ser [amo ng wo rld leaders ]…, hapless , increas ingly lo o py,” i.e., in effect, it
was  saying, Hato yama was  mad. The challenge to  Japan’s  s tatus  as  “client s tate” was  pro o f o f his  madness .
No  o ther majo r ally – o r, fo r that matter, no  enemy either – had ever been subjected to  the so rt o f advice, abuse and intimidatio n
that was  directed to  Hato yama, Japan’s  Prime Minis ter. The Hato yama cris is  co incided with revelatio ns  fro m Wikileaks  and fro m
do mestic Japanese so urces  attes ting to  pers is tent lying, deceptio n, secret deals , co ver-up, and manipulatio n by go vernments  in
Japan in o rder to  serve Washingto n. Servility was  inco mpatible with demo cracy and therefo re required deceptio n, secrecy, and
manipulatio n. Hato yama threatened to  untie the alliance kno t.
Hato yama’s  iso latio n grew as  the bureaucrats  o f the Departments  o f Fo reign Affairs  and Defense launched a “ro llback” o peratio n to
fo rce his  submiss io n,22 refus ing co o peratio n and ins tead co nspiring to  bring him do wn. Hemmed in by his  faithless  bureaucrats  and
to rn between the pressures  o f Washingto n o n the o ne hand and Okinawa o n the o ther which he lacked the co urage o r clarity to
co nfro nt, his  po litical po s itio n crumbled. The natio nal media blamed him fo r the deterio ratio n in the co untry’s  key relatio nship,
ins is ting that he cease o ffending and irritating the US.
Late in May 2010  Hato yama surrendered, anno uncing that he had given up o n his  attempt to  relo cate Futenma base o uts ide
Okinawa. Already befo re this  he had yielded to  US pressure by abando ning his  pro po sal fo r an Eas t As ian Co mmunity (by the time he
left o ffice he had expanded his  co nceptio n o f Eas t As ia to  include the US). When he handed the reins  o f go vernment to  Kan Nao to ,
Kan’s  task was  described thro ugho ut the natio nal media as  to  heal the “wo unds” that Hato yama had caused to  the alliance, res to re
Washingto n’s  trus t and co nfidence, and reso lve the Okinawa pro blem by “persuading” Okinawa to  accept the new base. In co ntras t to
the paean to  life with which Hato yama began his  go vernment, Kan’s  intro ducto ry po licy speech to  the Diet pro mised the “s teady
deepening o f the alliance relatio nship.” By that he meant he wo uld do  as  required. The “servile line” was  thus  res to red. What
Mago saki refers  to  as  the ascendancy o f the tsuiju rosen under the Demo cratic Party go vernments  fro m this  time is  what may also  be
seen as  the “mature” Client State.
The Hato yama vacillatio n and surrender, ho wever, had fundamentally altered o ne majo r element o f the equatio n. It left an o utraged,
aro used, determined Okinawa. Unlike elite bureaucrats  and vacillating po liticians , the Okinawan peo ple have s ince pro ved no t
susceptible to  co mpro mise. The fault lines  o f s truggle fo r an auto no mo us  natio nal po lity, fo r jus tice and demo cracy, thereafter
bisected Okinawa. Hato yama’s  res ignatio n, at o ne level a majo r defeat, at ano ther, therefo re, s ignalled a deepening o f res is tance.
As  fo r Nye, Armitage, and o ther “handlers ” o f the relatio nship, despite their o verweening attitude and assumptio n o f the prero gative
o f dictating to  Japan, they were respected, even revered, as  “pro -Japanese.” One well-placed Japanese o bserver recently wro te o f the
“fo ul o do r” he felt in the air aro und Washingto n and To kyo  given o ff by the activities  o f the “Japan-expert” and the “pro -Japan”
Americans  o n o ne s ide and “s lavish” “US-expert” and “pro -American” Japanese o n the o ther, bo th “living o ff” the unequal relatio nship
which they had helped co ns truct and suppo rt.23 Minis ter o f Fo reign Affairs  Gemba expressed his  pro fuse thanks  fo r these
interventio ns  when greeting Armitage, Nye and o ther gues ts  in 2012, express ing his  gratitude at “the advice pro ffered by Japan’s  true
friends .”24
Unit ed Kingdo m －Po o dle Po wer
Great Britain, like Japan, ho s ts  majo r US military facilities  and has  pro vided bas ing s ites  and co o perated in numero us  fighting wars
ever s ince 1939. Unlike the defeated enemy, Japan, Britain was  and is , o f co urse, the clo ses t o f allies , fo r which alo ne the terms
“grand alliance,” and “special relatio nship” have been co ined. In war zo nes  fro m the Firs t Wo rld War to  the o ngo ing declared and
undeclared wars  o f the Middle Eas t and Africa, Britain and the US have s to o d to gether, co nsulting and co llabo rating clo sely (tho ugh
o n o ccas io n Britain has  acted alo ne, as  in Suez  war o f 1956  and the Falklands  war with Argentina in 1982, and in the Vietnam War in
the 1960s  it res is ted pressure to  have its  so ldiers  engaged in a fighting ro le, sending o nly training fo rces ). Co nsultatio n, and
shared respo ns ibility, has  been the characteris tic o f Anglo -American wars . In that respect, British co mplicity is  deeper and s tro nger
than Japan’s . Whatever reservatio ns  within the frame o f the “special relatio nship” exis ted in the late 20 th century were swept away
under To ny Blair and in the “glo bal war o n terro r” fro m 2001.
Clare Sho rt, lo o king back ruefully in 2010  o n her part in the Blair cabinet’s  ro le in the war o n Iraq, referred to  Prime Minis ter To ny
Blair and Lo rd Go ldsmith, his  atto rney general, as  having mis led parliament and the cabinet befo re Britain, to  its  "eternal shame",
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jo ined the US-led invas io n o f Iraq. She to ld the Chilco t enquiry into  the UK's  invo lvement in the Iraq war and its  aftermath that the
pro cess  had been chao tic and fraught.
"We were in a bit o f a lunatic asylum. [Go ldsmith] mis led the cabinet. He certainly mis led me, but peo ple let it
thro ugh … I think fo r the atto rney general to  co me and say there's  unequivo cal legal autho rity to  go  to  war was
mis leading."
Altho ugh Prime Mins ter Blair had assured parliament o n 29  January 2003 that "We do  kno w o f links  between al-Qaeda and Iraq . . ."
in July 2010  the fo rmer head o f British intelligence, (MI5) Eliza Manningham-Buller co ntradicted him, telling the inquiry: "There is  no
credible intelligence to  sugges t that co nnectio n . . . [it was  the invas io n] that gave Osama Bin Laden his  Iraqi jihad." Asked to  what
extent the invas io n exacerbated the threat to  Britain fro m terro rism, she replied: "Subs tantially."25
And, o n the impress io n co nveyed by To ny Blair that Britain, thro ugh him exercised an impo rtant influence o n Washingto n, Sho rt said,
"I do n't think we influenced anything. [Ins tead]… we ended up humiliating o urselves  [with] unco nditio nal, po o dle-like
ado ratio n” because the “special relatio nship” meant “we jus t abjectly go  wherever America go es .”
She added,
"I think [Blair] was  so  frantic to  be with America that all that was  thro wn away … Britain needs  to  think abo ut this , the
special relatio nship. What do  we mean by it?  Do  we mean we have an independent relatio nship and we say what we
think, o r do  we mean we jus t abjectly go  wherever America go es  and that puts  us  in the big league? That's  a tragedy."
26
The implicatio n, as  Jo hn Pilger puts  it, is  that Blair co nspired in and executed an unpro vo ked war o f aggress io n agains t a
defenceless  co untry, which caused the deaths  o f mo re than a millio n peo ple, the flight o f ano ther fo ur millio n and the suffering o f
co untless  o thers , including a generatio n o f children, fro m malnutritio n, trauma, and the po iso ns  intro duced to  their enviro nment by
banned weapo ns  such as  tho se us ing depleted uranium (1.9  to ns  o f which were used in Iraq by British fo rces , acco rding to  Defence
Secretary Liam Fo x in July 2010).
In June 2010  the Internatio nal Criminal Co urt made the landmark decis io n to  add aggress io n to  its  lis t o f war crimes  that can be
pro secuted and in July Deputy Prime Minis ter Nick Clegg, fo rmally s tated in the Ho use o f Co mmo ns  that the invas io n o f Iraq had
indeed been illegal. By late 2012, the British inquiry had been underway fo r three years  and release o f its  final repo rt was  withheld
till mid-2013 at the earlies t.
Despite the s tro ng prima facie case that his  determined suppo rt o f war and reso rt to  deceptio n to  persuade parliament to  fo llo w him
warranted charges  o f war crimes , s ince his  retirement in 2007 Blair has  remained a “respected” internatio nal s tatesman, and been
well rewarded financially.27 Whatever respo ns ibility Britain might bear fo r war crimes  at this  time mus t be presumed shared also  by
Japan and Aus tralia, neither o f which had yet launched an inquiry co mparable to  Chilco t.
Ho wever, despite the indicatio ns  that Britain under Blair sank into  servility, it seems  that
go vernments  po s t-Blair may have attempted to  reco ver a measure o f auto no my. In 2012,
Britain was  repo rted to  have rebuffed US pleas  fo r the right to  use its  bases  in the UK
and o n Diego  Garcia, and British bases  o n Cyprus , to  suppo rt the build-up o f fo rces  in
the Gulf with a view to  po ss ible ho s tilities  agains t Iran. Any preemptive s trike o n Iran,
acco rding to  secret go vernment legal so urces , co uld be in breach o f internatio nal law.
"The UK wo uld be in breach o f internatio nal law if it facilitated what amo unted to  a pre-
emptive s trike o n Iran," said a senio r Whitehall so urce. "It is  explicit. The go vernment has
been us ing this  to  push back agains t the Americans ." 28
Aust ralia－Pacif ic Deput y Sherif f
Aus tralia is  a co untry familiar fro m its  his to ry with o ne o r o ther kind o f dependence, till
1941 primarily o riented to wards  what it knew as  its  “mo ther co untry” (Great Britain) and
s ince then to  America. As  Prime Minis ter Jo hn Curtin put it in late 1941, o n the advent o f
war with Japan, “Witho ut any inhibitio ns  o f any kind, I make it clear that Aus tralia lo o ks
to  America, free o f any pangs  as  to  o ur traditio nal links  o r kinship with the United
Kingdo m.
Aus tralia, secure in the American embrace, wo uld, he ins is ted, be kept as  “a citadel fo r
the British-speaking race.”29
Subsequently, the highes t impo rtance attached to  maintaining and reinfo rcing tho se war-
time ties . On majo r is sues , fro m the very s tart o f the po s t-war era Aus tralia abando ned
its  o wn po s itio ns  and ado pted tho se o n which Washingto n ins is ted. To  cite o nly two
early examples , in 1946 , under s tro ng American pressure it agreed to  grant exemptio n
fro m indictment to  the Japanese empero r despite having included him in the to p gro up o f
tho se it believed sho uld be subjected to  war crimes  trial. Two  years  later it acted agains t
the advice o f its  diplo mats  o n the gro und in Ko rea and endo rsed the American-impo sed
divis io n o f the co untry, the impo s itio n o f harsh military rule and the suppress io n o f
demo cratic and natio nalis t fo rces  (a harsh o ccupatio n fo r a suppo sedly liberated peo ple
that co ntras ted sharply with the so ft o ccupatio n fo r the defeated enemy, Japan). By so
submitting, and accepting (even with reluctance) the co nduct o f separate electio ns  which then led to  separate s tates , under
co nditio ns  in the so uth that Aus tralian o fficials  at the time described as  tho se o f po lice s tate terro r,30  it helped set the scene fo r
war. When war came, in June 1950, it rushed to  get its  fo rces  to  Ko rea as  quickly as  po ss ible, principally o ut o f the co ncern to  sho w
lo yalty and win gratitude fro m the US. As  then External Affairs  (Fo reign Affairs ) Secretary Jo hn Burto n wro te later: “facts  and even
direct Aus tralian interes ts  were thro wn as ide and the guiding ins tructio n was  to  ‘fo llo w the United States .’”31
A half-century later, Aus tralian Prime Minis ter Julia Gillard bo as ted (10  March 2011) that Aus tralia had “s tuck to gether” with the US
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in its  war o n Iraq. The independent M.P. Bo b Katter remarked that it was  so  impo rtant to  Aus tralia that,
“If the Americans  go  in [i.e., launch a war] and they reques t us  to  go  in, we abso lutely mus t go  in … Are we to  tag
alo ng as  the tail o f the do nkey? Yes , that is  abso lutely co rrect.”32
Aus tralia to day, fo llo wing Katter’s  principle, is  well kno wn fo r its  suppo rt fo r US wars , no  matter ho w geo graphically remo te o r ho w
fragile the legal bas is . It ho s ts  majo r US bases  (especially intelligence, spying, and miss ile target-related), has  jus t o pened its
Darwin do o r to  a US Marine co ntingent and is  co ns idering subs tantial US naval expans io n in Wes tern Aus tralia (an “Eighth” o r Indian
Ocean carrier fleet).33 When fis cal pressures  in 2012 led to  a cut in defence spending fro m 1.8  percent o f GDP to  1.56  percent,34 the
US go vernment s ignalled to  Aus tralia that such a cut was  unacceptable, military spending sho uld, if anything, be expanded.35
 
Alo ng with o ther US “client s tates ,” Aus tralia bears  a respo ns ibility,
rarely ackno wledged, fo r the o ften devas tating co nsequences  o f
diplo matic cho ices  ado pted o ut o f the belief that, at all co s ts , the
interes ts  o f their super-po wer ally had to  be given prio rity.
Three fo rmer Prime Minis ters  have recently is sued sharp warnings  to
Aus tralia o n what they see as  a s teepening path do wnwards  into
servility: Malco lm Fraser, co nservative Prime Minis ter between 1975
and 1978, referred to  the “pas t twenty years ,” in which
“we seem mo re and mo re than ever to  be lo cked into  the United
States ’ purpo ses  and o bjectives . … Unco nditio nal suppo rt diminishes
o ur influence thro ugho ut Eas t and So uth-Eas t As ia. It limits  o ur
capacity to  act as  an independent and co nfident natio n. It limits  o ur
influence o n the United States  herself.
The cho ice fo r Aus tralia to  make is  no t fo r China o r fo r the United
States , but independence o f mind to  break with subservience to  the
United States . Subservience has  no t and will no t serve Aus tralia’s
interes ts . It is  indeed dangero us  to  o ur future.36
In ano ther lecture, mo nths  later, Fraser added, “America is  in charge
o f o ur des tiny and that fills  me with co ncern.”37
Paul Keating, Labo ur Prime Minis ter between 1991 and 1996, was  if
anything mo re fo rthright.
''Our sense o f independence has  flagged, and as  it f lagged we have ro lled back into  an easy acco mmo datio n with the fo reign po licy
o bjectives  o f the United States  … Mo re latterly, o ur respect fo r the fo reign po licy o bjectives  o f the United States  has  superimpo sed
itself o n what sho uld o therwise be the fo reign po licy o bjectives  o f Aus tralia.''38
The pro blem had beco me acute, said Keating, during Jo hn Ho ward's  prime minis tership.
''After playing the deputy sheriff, Jo hn Ho ward had us  dancing to  the tune o f the United States  in Iraq and Afghanis tan,''
He was  also  fiercely critical o f his  successo r, Julia Gillard, fo r allo wing [in December 2011] US Pres ident, Barack Obama, to  make
''an o ral and po licy assault o n China and its  po lity fro m the lo wer chamber o f o ur Parliament Ho use.”
Kevin Rudd, Labo ur Prime Minis ter between 2007 and 2010, altho ugh a China scho lar and Chinese speaker kno wn fo r his  hawkish
views  o n China, nevertheless  called in 2012 fo r a co o perative, multilateral Pax Pacifica to  replace the current Pax Americana (o r any
po ss ible Pax Sinica) as  the security frame fo r the co ming era.39  There is  no  precedent fo r the is sue o f such high-level warnings  o n
the future o f the co untry.
Co nclusio n
The zokkoku, dependent-independent, servile s tate syndro me is  no t co nfined to  Japan and needs  to  be s tudied fro m a co mparative
perspective, bo th acro ss  regio ns  and acro ss  time. Glo bally, it may be, and pro bably is , a diminishing pheno meno n but in Aus tralia,
the United Kingdo m and Japan it remains  s tro ng.
The truth is  that the US do es  no t admit o f “equality” in its  relatio ns  with any o ther s tate. “Allies ” tend to  be appreciated fo r their
servility. The mo s t warmly welco med leaders  are tho se mo s t ready to  fo llo w the (To ny) Blair path, even if it means  beco ming kno wn
in their o wn co untries  as  “po o dles .” Where Blair was  a regular and feted vis ito r to  the White Ho use, dis senters  fro m the servile line
are fro zen o ut and ridiculed, as  Hato yama fo und in 2009. Client s tates , tied vertically to  their “patro n,” are s tructurally incapable o f
dis sent and thus  co mplicit in acts  by which their patro n abuses  internatio nal law and engages  in criminal acts  o f aggress io n, war,
and to rture. They bear a respo ns ibility fo r the co nsequences  o f their suppo rt fo r the US and the co nsequences  that fo llo wed,
terrible fo r Ko reans  (and later fo r Vietnamese), and catas tro phic s till later fo r Iraqis , Afghans  and o thers . They thus  help sus tain a
vertically framed glo bal o rder inco mpatible with universal principles . Fo r Japan and Eas t As ia, the self-abnegatio n and servility at the
heart o f the Japanese s tate serves  to  subvert any pro ject fo r As ian co mmunity and to  des tabilize rather than s tabilize the regio n.
Japan, Aus tralia, and Great Britain ins is t that the US military is  the so urce and guaranto r o f freedo m and so urce o f the “o xygen” that
guarantees  peace and security to  the regio n, but the fact is  that the same o xygen has  co mmo nly been experienced as  po iso n,
vis iting catas tro phe o n co untry after co untry, fro m Ko rea, Iran, and Guatemala in the 1950s  thro ugh Vietnam (1960s  to  70s), Chile
(1973), the Pers ian Gulf (1991), Afghanis tan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-), and that no w threatens  Pakis tan, So malia, Yemen, and
(again) Iran. As  Brent Sco wcro ft, the fo rmer natio nal security adviser to  the Gerald Fo rd and Geo rge H. Bush adminis tratio ns  put it
recently referring to  the US invas io n o f Iraq, “I do n’t think the Pres ident wo uld have do ne it abso lutely alo ne. He needed so me co ver,
and yo u and the British gave it to  him.”40  If he is  right, Aus tralia (to gether with United Kingdo m and Japan) shares  respo ns ibility fo r
the co nsequences  o f co llus io n in an illegal act o f aggress ive war.
As  between the three servile co untries , Japan is  dis tinctive in that it is  subjected to  greater deris io n, co ntempt, o vert and
co mprehens ive directio n, than either o f the US’s  two  “o ld allies .” It to o k 20  years  befo re the relatio nship between the US and Japan
under the 1960  Mutual Security treaty was  firs t referred to  as  an “alliance,” and the co mprehens ive s tatements  o f des iderata is suing
fro m Washingto n o n everything fro m ho urs  o f the wo rking week to  co ns titutio nal refo rm, humbly received in To kyo , wo uld be
unimaginable in US relatio ns  with, either Great Britain o r Aus tralia.
As  Clare Sho rt remarked o f the British case, the delus io n that it might be po ss ible to  influence, o r to  mo derate, US po licy was
s ignificant, and it is  a delus io n that was  pro bably shared by Aus tralians . But in the Japanese case it seems  unlikely that any
Japanese leader serio us ly co ntemplates  such a po ss ibility. Yet, iro nically, the mo re abject the fealty pro fessed by Japanese leaders ,
the greater appears  to  be the co ntempt with which they are met in Washingto n. The ado ptio n o f such patro n-client o r mas ter-servant
relatio ns  militates  agains t fo rmatio n o f any regio nal o r glo bal co mmunity, because it inclines  co ncerned parties  to  think o f
diplo matic relatio ns  in terms  o f superio r/inferio r, mas ter/servant, and to  repro duce tho se inequitable and unequal relatio nships
bo th do mes tically and internatio nally.
In the 50 th year o f the Ampo  relatio nship between the US and Japan, a mo re unequal,
mis represented, misunders to o d bilateral relatio nship between two  mo dern s tates  wo uld be diff icult to  imagine. Ho wever, where all
challenges  to  the do minant servile line had been beaten back thro ugh the s ix and a half decades  o f po s t-1945 Japan, the equatio n
has  no w altered. All attempts  by go vernments  in To kyo  and Washingto n to  persuade, buy o ff, o r intimidate Okinawa into  submiss io n
have failed. Unequal tho ugh the co ntes t is , the fact is  that the peo ple o f Okinawa have success fully res is ted the go vernments  in
To kyo  and Washingto n fo r s ixteen years . The Hato yama betrayal o f 2010  reinfo rced their determinatio n and widened the cris is  fro m
Okinawa to  the Japan-US relatio nship. It go es  witho ut saying that the Japanese s tate co uld reso rt to  fo rce agains t Okinawa to
reso lve it, but that wo uld be to  expo se the nature o f the zokkoku relatio nship and undermine it, perhaps  fatally.
The Okinawan mo vement, were it to  o ccur anywhere in a s tate no t part o f o r affiliated to  the Wes tern wo rld’s  majo r po wers , wo uld be
acclaimed, given the name o f a flo wer, and its  pro po nents  treated as  hero es . But Okinawa’s  leaders  are unkno wn, internatio nal
so lidarity is  minimal, and the super-po wer “pro po nents  o f demo cracy” in Washingto n and To kyo  co ncentrate o n finding ways  to
neutralize o r crush them. To day, therefo re, altho ugh Okinawa, seen as  the zokkoku o f a zokkoku, is  treated with co ntempt in bo th
Washingto n and To kyo , it co ns titutes  the “immo vable o bs tacle” co nfro nting the client s tate relatio nship.
On the eve o f the 2012 US pres idential electio n, the Ryukyu shimpo po sed a ques tio n fo r candidates  Barack Obama and Mitt Ro mney:
“Why do es  the US that upho lds  the high ideals  o f freedo m and demo cracy and respect o f bas ic human rights  and the rule o f law no t
implement them in Okinawa?”41 Later, anno uncing the electio n result, it repeated the ques tio n, “Isn’t it time no w fo r demo cracy and
human rights  in Okinawa?”42 To  respo nd to  that plea wo uld be to  begin to  renego tiate the US-Japan relatio nship. To  igno re it is  to
deepen the cris is  and make mo re likely that the eventual s cale o f renego tiatio n will be greater. The attentio n that Mago saki’s
sho cking thes is  (and in mo re mo des t ways  my o wn) no w attracts  sugges ts , ho wever, that the parameters  o f po litical analys is  and
debate are shifting. So o ner o r later, the “US ques tio n” and the Japan-US relatio nship will have to  be faced.
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